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THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. By Walter Adams and James w. Brock
New York: Pantheon Books. 1986. Pp. vii, 426. $22.95.
Over the past decade, economists, economic journalists, and politicians have commented endlessly on the inability of American firms to
compete in international markets. Although analyses and policy prescriptions vary, many commentators have suggested that the nation
should abandon its "antiquated" notions of antitrust to restore the
competitive position of its firms. 1 These commentators, representing
positions all along the ideological spectrum, argue that given modern
economic conditions and production technologies, economic organizations of extremely large scale are necessary to achieve economically
efficient production (pp. 27-29). Commentators on opposing ends of
the spectrum disagree about the optimal make-up and nature of these
giant organizations, but not about the need for great size (pp. 4-7, 35167).
In The Bigness Complex, Walter Adams2 and James W. Brock3
argue that the gigantic size these commentators advocate is part of the
nation's economic problem, not part of a solution to that problem.
The Bigness Complex systematically debunks what its authors label
the "mythical assumptions" on which the pervasive belief that "bigger
is necessary" rests. The authors' analysis shows that gigantic size not
only fails to produce the assumed efficiency gains, but more often results in reduced efficiency. Adams and Brock argue further that even
if Bigness did result in some efficiency gains, the apologists of Bigness
fail to consider the deleterious effects of the power that accrues to the
gigantic economic organizations they advocate. The giants use this
power to influence the government and to avoid the discipline of the
marketplace. All in all, the book presents a readable and spirited defense of the virtues of controlled competition and the traditional
American concept of antitrust at a time when these values are neglected, and even rejected, in almost all of the literature accessible to
the layperson.
Adams and Brock divide their exposition into five parts. In part 1,
the authors contrast the importance of power - economic and political, private and public - with the dearth of recognition accorded
power in traditional academic economics (chs. 1 & 2). The authors
suggest that it is largely the recognition of'the role of power that leads
1. See, e.g., Baldridge, Rx/or Export Woes: Antitrust Relief, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1985, at 28,
col. 3; Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrost Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, sec. 3, at 2, col. 3.
2. Distinguished University Professor and former president, Michigan State University,
member of Attorney General Brownell's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. B.A.
1942, Brooklyn College; M.A. 1946, Yale University; Ph.D. 1947, Yale University.
3. Associate Professor of Economics, Miami University (Ohio). B.S. 1973, University of Wyoming; M.A. 1975, University of Wyoming; Ph.D. 1981, Michigan State University.
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them to reject the "Bigness Complex" (pp. 7, 14-21). Although the
authors' attempt to define the term power may not be entirely satisfying as a matter of formal theory, most readers will have little difficulty
accepting the proposition that the ability of gigantic organizations to
influence government is a manifestation of power.
After discussing generally the role they believe power should play
in economic theory and analysis, the authors proceed in part 2 to examine the empirical foundations of the assumption on which most
economists ground their support for Bigness - that Big is efficient.
The authors note that there are three facets to the concept of efficiency
- operating efficiency, innovation efficiency, and social efficiency and divide their discussion accordingly.
The authors first tackle the relationship between size and operating
efficiency (ch. 3). The question here is whether production costs fall as
size increases. Operating efficiency requires that both production units
(i.e., factories) and administrative units (i.e., firms) be of optimal scale.
Adams and Brock accept the notion that modern production techniques require production units of some considerable size. Studies by
Joe S. Bain in the 1950s4 and F.M. Sherer in the late 1970s, 5 however,
have shown that production unit efficiencies do not require firms of the
size that many advocate today. A defense of Bigness resting on operating efficiency, therefore, must be grounded on the more controversial
notion that large firm size produces significant administrative
efficiencies.
Administrative efficiencies are said to result from the ability to
spread administrative expenses over several production units, eliminating duplicative administrative functions. Adams and Brock examine evidence from several industries and conclude that
administrative efficiency fails to justify Bigness. 6 The authors find that
after a firm achieves the size necessary to employ production units of
efficient scale, a size considerably smaller than the average firm in
many industries today, increased firm size not only fails to create further efficiencies but may often result in efficiency losses.
4. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 73, 85-88 (1956).
5. See F.M. SHERER, THE EcONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION 339 (Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 145, 1975).
6. Pp. 42-45. The authors first note that despite the steel industry's need for enormous production units, it is the single plant "mini-mill" firms that are meeting foreign competition while
domestic giants such as USX are successful only in obtaining ever higher tariffs from an ever
more pliable Congress. Pp. 34-38. The authors then consider the automotive industry where
General Motors has recently established its Saturn division with the goal of making the new
venture as independent as possible from the stifling GM bureaucracy. Pp. 40-41. Finally the
authors examine the recent trend toward conglomerate Bigness and argue that the evidence suggests that the combination of functionally unrelated firms in a single conglomerate structure has
resulted in significant efficiency losses. The authors believe that the recent trend toward divestitures reflects the business community's delayed recognition of the inadvisability of conglomerate
structure. Pp. 41-45.
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The authors next consider the relationship between firm size and
innovation efficiency (ch. 4). The appropriate inquiry here is whether
a firm's virtuosity in developing and improving products and methods
of production increases as a function of firm size. Contrary to the
image carefully cultivated by the largest corporations' advertising departments, 7 the authors' data suggests that smaller firms expend
greater efforts in the pursuit of innovation and achieve a greater innovative output at a lower cost (pp. 50-57). Thus, despite the theoretical
advantages of large firms, small firms and even individuals are more
prolific innovators. 8
In chapter 5 the authors tum to the final facet of the concept of
efficiency, the question of social efficiency. The question here is
whether, given certain technological limitations, an economy of large
firms produces a more desirable combination of goods and services
than an economy of smaller firms. In the academic economist's world
of "perfect competition," the market mechanism coordinates the activities of the economy, allocates scarce resources, and achieves optimal
economic outcomes. In an economy of concentrated industries, however, much of this planning is taken from the impersonal forces of the
market and placed in the hands of the corporate giants. Thus, an
economy dominated by a few giant firms will produce a less desirable
combination of goods and services and will skew the allocation of society's resources in favor of the giant firms themselves. 9 One goal of the
antitrust laws is to create an economy approximating.this model of
"perfect competition" so that the market may perform these coordinating and allocative functions. Hence, the authors urge that the antitrust laws be strictly enforced to create more competitive markets,
7. Many economists have also suggested that large firms are better innovators. See, e.g., J.K.
86 (2d
rev. ed. 1956).
8. Adams and Brock suggest that the red tape, specialization, conformity, and general conservatism associated with bureaucratic structures are contrary to the spirit of innovation. Pp. 5557. The authors further note that large organizations may have the power and the motivation to
suppress innovations that could alter the market in which the firms operate. Pp. 61-64. The
authors' discussion of the suppression of innovation focuses on the pain-control drug industry.
Pp. 62-64.
9. Adams and Brock illustrate the influence of gigantic corporations in social planning by
considering the role of General Motors in the development of urban transportation, pp. 67-69,
automotive fuel consumption, pp. 69-72, and automotive emissions and air pollution, pp. 72-74.
In each of these three areas, GM's interests differed significantly from what most would consider
society's interests. The oligopolistic structure of the auto industry and GM's tremendous economic and political clout nonetheless allowed the corporation to impede the development of
pollution-free electric trains in favor of GM-produced cars a.nd buses in urban transportation, to
restrict production of more fuel efficient but less profitable small cars, and to slow the development of pollution control devices despite increasing evidence of the damage automotive emissions
caused.
The authors also discuss the role of Big Oil in securing oil import restraints that artificially
accelerated the rate at which America's domestic oil reserves were depleted, and the role of these
same companies in the suppression of alternative energy sources. Pp. 74-78.
GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER
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resulting in a more desirable combination of goods and services than
results from our current economic structure.
After dispensing with the arguments of those who attempt to justify the power of Bigness by reference to efficiency gains, Adams and
Brock ask in part 3 how a society can be structured to avoid the conglomeration of power inherent in a political or economic system dominated by a few large-scale structures. For Adams and Brock, the
answers to this architectural question were framed in the years after
· 1776. In chapter 6, the authors discuss how the founders constructed
a governmental system of separated powers such that no one branch of
government could tum the coercive power of the state against another
or against the people. The American constitutional system, however,
provides only for the control of public power; it does not concern itself
with the undue conglomerations of private power that may pose a
greater threat today (pp. 94-95).
For a plan to control great concentrations of private power, Adams and Brock look to Adam Smith's 1776 work, The Wealth of Nations. As the authors interpret Smith's work in chapter 7, the '
competitive market scatters economic power widely among the people,
leaving no individual or group of individuals capable of exerting undue
private power. The market itself is said to serve as society's regulatory
authority and planning mechanism (pp. 101-03). The authors submit
that the political blueprint of the American Constitution and the economic blueprint of Smith's The Wealth ofNations still provide the best
available plans for avoiding concentrations of power antithetical to
both efficiency and individual liberty (pp. 85-86).
Adams and Brock, contrary to the proponents of the Chicago
School, do not interpret Smith's blueprint to mean that the competitive market is a self-perpetuating product of nature (pp. 110-13, 21112). They see the competitive market as a delicate mechanism that
can easily be subverted by private interests wishing to escape its discipline or desiring to take over its planning function. In part 4, the authors maintain that a society that seeks the benefits of a free enterprise
system must vigilantly protect the competitive market from "subversion and erosion." In chapter 8 the authors argue that in the United
States, this protection is accomplished through the antitrust laws. According to the authors, "Just as the purpose of the U.S. Constitution
was to prevent cartels or monopolies from controlling the coercive
power of the state, so the basic objective of antitrust is to prevent them
from controlling economic decision-making in a free society." 10
After establishing the importance of antitrust to the proper func10. P. 108. As the passage indicates, Adams and Brock believe that the "basic objective" of
the antitrust laws is the control of the economic and political power that arises from economic
concentration. Other commentators reject the notion that the antitrust laws should be used to
control corporate power, arguing that they should be concerned solely with greater economic
efficiency. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). The view that economic effi-
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tioning of the economy, Adams and Brock proceed in chapter 9
through chapter 15 to examine and critique historical and modem applications of the antitrust laws. The authors work sequentially
through the major judicial precedents and current trends in the antitrust areas of conspiracy (ch. 9), monopoly (ch. 10), and mergers (ch.
11)-horizontal (ch. 12), vertical (ch. 13), and conglomerate (ch. 14).
The authors' analysis suggests that although the antitrust laws could
operate as an effective guardian of the competitive market, current enforcement practices and, to a lesser extent, current doctrinal trends
make today's antitrust laws an insufficient protector of the competitive
system.II
In part 5, the authors argue that the maintenance of a competitive
economy may often require government action beyond enforcement of
the antitrust laws. The authors see a further role for the government
in several areas where competitive markets fail. Unlike some on the
political right, Adams and Brock see an important role for government in the exercise of the state's traditional police powers. Government, not the market, the authors believe, must make decisions about
health and safety, pollution, toxic wastes, military spending, and genetic engineering (p. 211). They also recognize that the government
should regulate "natural monopolies" (pp. 211-12).
The danger of governmental involvement, according to the authors, is that the regulation necessary to correct market failures will,
through the influence of private power, be turned into a system in
which the government permits and even aids the industry's avoidance
of competition. The authors note that it was a laudable concern with
safety that caused the government to begin its regulation of the airline
industry. After the regulation began, however, it was transformed,
through collusion between the government and the industry, into a
means of escaping competition. I2 The authors suggest, therefore, that
subject to restraints imposed by the government's rightful interests in
exercising its police powers, regulating natural monopolies, and controlling externalities, deregulation should be implemented so that regulated industries will again be subject to the rigors of the marketplace
rather than to the dictates of an often pliable governmental agency
(ch. 19).
Some commentators have suggested that we need not worry about
ciency is the sole goal of the antitrust laws may currently command a majority of the Supreme
Court. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
11. See pp. 194-208. The authors note particularly that antitrust, especially the criminal
branch of antitrust enforcement, is a political instrument. As a political instrument it is subject
to the influence of the political power of the very enterprises it is designed to regulate. P. 208.
12. See pp. 219-31. Other examples cited include the ability of the steel and automotive
industries to obtain significant tariffs and quotas against foreign competition (ch. 20), the government bailouts of Lockheed and Chrysler (ch. 22), and government subsidization of nuclear power
in the face of huge cost overruns and concerns about reactor safety and waste disposal (ch. 21).
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concentrations of private power because each concentration of power
is counterbalanced by an opposing concentration. 13 Thus, labor
power, industrial power, and governmental power are said to balance
one another, each concentration preventing the other two from causing harm. As Adams and Brock point out in part 6, however, these
purportedly opposing powers not only fail to counter one another, but
often coalesce into an even stronger power block. When the UAW
joined the auto companies in calling for trade restrictions and demanding the bailout of Chrysler, we saw an example of the "Labor-Industrial Complex" (ch. 23). The authors also discuss the "MilitaryIndustrial Complex" and the revolving personnel door between the
military and the handful of important military contractors (ch. 24).
The authors conclude that, contrary to the favorable claims made
for it, disproportionate size gives rise to economic and political power
that undermines operation, innovation, and social efficiency, erodes effective competition and good economic performance, and permits the
manipulation of public policy. The authors urge that economic power
be dispersed to the maximum extent feasible. While not offering an
exhaustive list of policy proposals, they suggest tighter restrictions on
mergers (pp. 372-73), further deregulation of industries that are naturally competitive (pp. 373-74), reduced barriers to foreign trade (pp.
374-75), increased competitive bidding for defense contracts (pp. 37577), and a policy of refusing to bail out failing private firms regardless
of their size and political power. 14
The Bigness Complex is a very readable book. While apparently
adding little, if anything, new to the technical literature, the authors'
tone of reasoned yet spirited advocacy allows the book to impart a
great deal of information without reading like an almanac. The authors appear to be addressing the educated lay audience and explain
the economic concepts they employ in a way that even the most
number-shy will find accessible. The book seems ideally suited for use
in an undergraduate political economy course. Nonetheless, there is
likely much that even the more specialized reader can gain from this
work. 15
Moreover, the book fills an important gap in the recent economic
literature. Much has been written over the last several years advocat13. The classic statement of this theory is John Kenneth Galbraith's 1952 work AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER. See note 7, supra.
14. Pp. 377·78. While urging the adoption of these proposals, the authors recognize that the
Bigness Complex has a strong foothold in both the Reagan administration and the Congress and,
therefore, that there is little likelihood that any of these proposals will be adopted in the near
future. Pp. 378·79.
15. For those with a technical background in both economics and American antitrust law,
see Adams and Brock, The 'New Learning' and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1515 (1986). This excellent article presents most of the arguments made in The Bigness Complex
without the background explanation included in the book.
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ing the adoption of an industrial policy 16 or, conversely, advocating
the almost complete withdrawal of the government's influence in the
economy.17 Yet no work accessible to the layperson has presented an
adequate defense of the economic assumptions underlying traditional
American antitrust policies: that decentralization of power, both political and economic, not only increases political liberty but also enhances economic performance. The Bigness Complex succeeds
brilliantly in filling this gap in the literature.

- James R. Steffen

16. See, e.g., R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983).
17. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980).

